Is it a Contradiction to Say that God Doesn’t Exist?
“I AM who I AM”, God says to Moses in the story of Moses and the burning bush . It is uncanny to note that God had described himself as “Being”, using the attribute of existence as that which defined him, centuries before Descartes and Anselm had taken up the same line of thought, expanding it into arguments which were fiercely contested, the gist of these arguments being that existence was part of the nature and definition of God. Although these arguments have drawn much flak, I think that it is a contradiction to say that God doesn’t exist. A description of the arguments for the necessary existence of God, and a discussion of the objections to them, shall follow.
The argument for the necessary existence of God is based on our concept of God. We can conceive of God as “that which nothing greater can be conceived” . God could either be an intellectual conception or a reality. If God were only an intellectual conception, we could still conceive of something greater, and that would be a God who was a reality. In being, a God who existed in reality would be greater than a God who did not really exist. However, since we cannot conceive anything greater than God, God cannot exist only as a concept (God cannot “not exist”). Hence, it would be a contradiction to say that God did not exist. For convenience, this argument will be called the ontological argument. Simply put, the ontological argument is the claim that non-existence goes against our definition of God as the greatest being we can conceive, and hence God must exist.
Our conception of God as omnipotent also allows for a second, simpler argument. Since God has the power to do everything, he would have the power to exist. Descartes says: “We shall thus understand that necessary existence is contained in the idea of a supremely powerful being… because it belongs to the true and immutable nature of such a being that it exists.” Hence, to say that God didn’t exist would be a contradiction, for it would be to say that God was not all-powerful; which, by definition, he was.
The ontological argument involves the assumption that a real God is greater than a fictional God. Le Poidevin claims that we have no basis for this assumption. The fictional God, says Le Poidevin, has all the qualities that the real God (if he exists) has. He is omnipotent and surpassingly great in the fiction that we have constructed, just as the real God (if he exists) is omnipotent and surpassingly great in the real world. Hence, a real God cannot be greater than a fictional God, as both of them possess “surpassing greatness” as a property: one in fiction, and one in the real world. We cannot claim that existence, as a property, makes the one greater than the other. Supporting Le Poidevin’s claims would be a comparison of the tooth fairy and an ant. Le Poidevin would say that surely the tooth fairy, who does not exist, possesses more greatness, albeit in our minds, than the ant who possesses little greatness and little power.
I do not agree with Le Poidevin. Something that actually exists is, in my opinion, definitely greater than something that only exists as a concept. There is no basis for saying that the power of the tooth fairy is greater than the power of an ant, even though the tooth fairy can, in our minds, grant wishes and give rewards, which is far more than an ant can do, because to compare nothing with something and say that nothing is greater is simply ridiculous. For even though our concept of the tooth fairy endows her with superpowers, the existence of the tooth fairy needs to be the base of all these properties, and the tooth fairy simply does not exist. We are comparing a nonentity, which has the property of exceeding greatness, with an entity that has the property of a little greatness. Yet, simply because the entity is something, we must admit that it is greater than the nonentity, because the little greatness the entity has exists, while the exceeding greatness the nonentity has does not exist. Non-existence can be compared to an arbitrary zero, which multiplied by the highest number still gives a lower result than 1 multiplied by the lowest possible existing result. Being is greater than non-being, and hence Le Poidevin’s claim that the ontological argument has a false premise is unfounded.
To argue that it is a contradiction to say that God doesn’t exist links only the concept of existence with the concept of a supreme being . Thus, say the detractors of the ontological argument, it doesn’t follow that God actually exists, but only that our idea of God must include the idea that he exists. This is all well and good, but I think that the concept of existence is very different from the concept of any other property, say the concept of being yellow. For example, I may have the conception of a fruit that is a cross between a banana and a lemon. This Banamon is necessarily yellow. However, it is only the concept of a banamon that is linked with the concept of yellow, as the banamon does not actually exist. To compare the concepts of God and existence as being linked in the same way is absurd, because to link the concept of existence with an idea would not be merely saying that the idea exists only in our imaginations, but that the thing depicted in the idea itself actually exists. An idea itself can exist, but for an idea to be logically and methodically linked with the property of existence would necessarily mean that it has to exist in the real world. When the ontological argument says that our concept of God must necessarily include the attribute of existence, this does not mean merely that God exists in our minds, but that he exists in the real world.
A last objection against the ontological argument would be this: if this argument were true it could be extended to include all kinds of perfect ideas. Theoretically, a perfect triangle could exist, because it would not have imperfection in its nature, and hence would not have non-existence as something that defined it. However, we know that most perfect ideas (perfect shapes, perfect animals, perfect symmetries) only exist in our heads. How then can we say that God is not merely also an intellectual concept? I think that this is because God is by definition the embodiment of all perfection, whereas any other ideas of perfect shapes or animals would only be representations of perfection in one aspect or a few (shape, strength, beauty) but not necessarily in the aspect of being. Hence, this objection cannot stand.
Even though I have tried to show here that the ontological argument holds despite the objections against it, I believe that the strongest evidence of God’s existence is that the knowledge of good and evil, of truth and falsehood, exist in our world. It may not seem a contradiction to some to say that God doesn’t exist, but a far better appeal is the evidence of our ability to judge, our capacity for feeling, and our appreciation of beauty. To our intellects it may be difficult to argue against the non-existence of God, but to our hearts it is certainly easy.
Postscript: I don't know whether I should have started with the Bible because I think the professor marking my essay would probably think: "religious freak!"... and the funniest thing happened on my way to uni! I was running to hand up my essay before 4 o clock and I passed this door in the philo department marked "poidevin". Did a double take but was rushing to get my essay in so fought with the hordes of people filling in their coversheets and jostling for the essay box. After I'd handed it in, I walked past the door again. It said, in gold letters: R. L. Poidevin!!! Dammit!!!!
