Sexual Perversion

The concept of sexual perversion is like the grin of the Cheshire Cat; it lingers on when the conditions of its possibility have been removed. Discuss.

The concept of sexual perversion seems to be an elusive one; attempts to define sexual perversion have been vague and uncertain at best. Any definitions of sexual perversion would only be accepted if they were objective, if they could account for the sexual practices unanimously and unequivocally considered perverted (sadism and masochism, exihibitionism, voyeurism, fetishism, bestiality, necrophilia and paedophilia ), and leave out the sexual practices not commonly considered perverted, or the ones which are contestable (such as homosexuality). Working backwards and finding a definition (a question, so to speak) to fit the practices (the answers, as it were) we already think perverted seems to be the best approach to analysing the concept of sexual perversion. Attempts to find a suitable definition for sexual perversion in this way by various philosophers shall be discussed, and found to be lacking, in this essay. As such, it seems as though we should do away with the term (and concept of) sexual perversion altogether. However, sexual perversion still “lingers on”, both as a descriptive term and a concept. In this essay, I will also attempt to show why, beyond all reason, we still consider certain sexual practices perverted, even though we do not possess a suitable definition of perversion encompassing these practices.

An instinctive definition for sexual perversion is: that which is sexually unnatural. This definition of sexual perversion raises several problems, of which the foremost is: how can we determine whether a sexual practice is natural or not? Philosophers have taken several approaches to this. Three of these approaches shall be discussed: the biological approach, the teleological approach (which overlaps slightly with the biological) and the statistical approach.

St. Thomas Aquinas, the medieval Catholic theologian, took the biological approach . In meditating on the inevitable consequence of sexual intercourse, and believing that sex was for the function of reproduction, he condemned many sexual practices, including masturbation and homosexuality, as unnatural and wrong. Any sexual act that did not lead to reproduction interfered with the course of nature and was hence unnatural and perverted. His argument seems to create a few problems. In believing that sex was for the primary purpose of reproduction and that any sexual act that deviated against this purpose was perverted, he would be condemning contraception and oral sex as perverted as well, where they would not be commonly called perverted, either in his time or ours. There was no lack of birth control in the ancient world, where women would commonly drink herbal potions of various plants now known by laboratory analysis to be somewhat effective in preventing pregnancy. “Vaginal wool suppositories” were also somewhat amusingly recommended by Byzantine medical writers in Gynaikeia of Soranos, published in the 2nd century, as being able to prevent pregnancy. Oral sex, being rich in symbolism, was even the subject of a poem by Thomas Carew. Aquinas’ definition of the sexually perverse seems to include in its scope acts not many would call perverted. Hence, this definition of the unnatural and the perverted does not work.

In another attempt to distinguish between the natural and the unnatural, other functions are attributed to sex, such as giving pleasure to the individual. This appears to be another biological approach, the nerve endings in the clitoris and the male sexual organs seemingly put there by nature to make sex a pleasurable experience. Any versions of sex that go against the function of providing pleasure would be unnatural, and hence perverted. However, this definition appears to be incomplete, since necrophilia and bestiality, sexual acts commonly termed perversions, do seem to provide immense pleasure to the person involved. Pleasure would seem a rather simplistic description of the function of sex, and to call perverted sexual acts providing no pleasure would be a ridiculously one-dimensional approach. A more sophisticated definition of the perverted would be needed. In addition to this, many people think that a sexual pervert would be someone who derived pleasure from what would normally be an unprofitable or unpleasurable act. Considering whether the denial of pleasure in a sexual act leads to perversion seems to lead us in a circle, as the person would not commit the act if not to gain sexual pleasure in the first place.

It would seem to make more sense to consider flourishing, rather than pleasure, when attempting to analyse the concept of the unnatural and perversion, in the pursuit of a more sophisticated argument. This is attempted most recently by Donald Levy, who claims that an unnatural act “is one that denies a person (oneself or another) one or more of the basic human goods ‘without necessity’ ” . In his point of view, an unnatural act would be one that did not contribute to the overall amount of happiness (flourishing) in society. Deriving pleasure by detracting from human flourishing would hence be deemed unnatural and perverted. Levy also says: “denying oneself or another a basic human good without some other basic human good being expected or intended to be made possible thereby is always wrong, and is also a necessary condition of perversion”.

This view of perversion seems to account for both sexual perversion and perversion itself. Practices such as necrophilia do not contribute to the flourishing of the individual, even though they contribute to his pleasure, because he would probably derive greater pleasure from knowing that his physical pleasure was reciprocated and contributing to the arousal of another person. Paedophilia would naturally be perverted since the child would be harmed by its practice, and bestiality would not contribute to the overall flourishing of the human race, because the practice of bestiality would deny that one person (whose place might have been taken by the accursed beast!) the pleasure that that he might have had.

However, this account of perversion has its problems. It seems to be rather forced, stretching its arm out to fit in every commonly defined perversion while vainly straining to leave out sexual acts deemed immoral but not perverted. For example, this account, at first glance, implies that adultery would be a perversion because the sexual pleasure of the wife would have been denied by her adulterous husband. Levy knows this and seems to tack on the clause, “without necessity”, to create a safety net for himself. Levy seems to imply that adultery is necessary for the adulterous husband, even though it denies his wife her pleasure, because it contributes to the flourishing of the husband and his mistress, and hence it cannot be called a perversion. Levy’s definition of perversion would mean that if the basic human good gained by the husband and his mistress more than make up for the basic human good lost by the wife, adultery would be wrong (the purposeful denial of pleasure), but would not be a perversion (as the necessary condition of the pleasure of another was included). This seems to be very forced, and all the problems of measuring human flourishing and the human good lost and gained come with Levy’s definition of perversion.

Furthermore, in saying that immorality is a necessary condition of perversion, he confuses the two and contradicts himself. Shades of one may be seen in the other, but to “deny oneself or another a basic human good without condition” is definitely wrong, though not necessarily a perversion. Fetishism and bestiality are commonly viewed as sexual perversions, but they are not usually thought to be immoral, particularly not if the object of fetishism was an inanimate object such as a sock or a shoe, or if the animal in question was unharmed, or even, horrors, had derived sexual pleasure from the act of bestiality. Other sexual acts commonly viewed as immoral, such as prostitution, seem to contribute to human flourishing and at the same time, cannot be classified as perversions and are commonly practiced. Levy’s attempt to define perversion using “basic human good” as a parameter fails not only because it is forced, but also because he does not distinguish the immoral and the perverse.

Clearly, attempting to define sexual perversion by unnaturalness biologically or teleologically (as detracting from human flourishing) fails. Another teleological attempt is made to define perversion as the unnatural by Nagel, who holds that both parties must be mutually aroused by each other for sex to have fulfilled its proper function. Any sexual practice thwarting mutual arousal is seen as a perversion. This seems to be a good account of perversion as it excludes practices we now view as deviations from the ordinary, but not perversions, such as homosexuality. However, it excludes practices such as sadomasochism, commonly thought of as a perversion, because the parties involved are mutually aroused by each other. And the thought that an animal could be aroused by bestiality is ludicrous, yet not impossible or unthinkable; still, this possibility would make nonsense of Nagel’s definition of perversion.

In attempting to leave out all considerations except objectivity in defining unnaturality, and hence, sexual perversion, Goldman calls all sexual desires perverted which are statistically abnormal in form. This seems a rather neat, mathematical, unbiased way of defining sexual perversion. However, this account of perversion has its problems. Firstly, the statistical norm of sexual practice would be heterosexual sex, which might mean that homosexual sex would be a perversion where it is now not commonly viewed to be so. To say that the statistical norm of sexual practice would be heterosexual sex would not necessarily include necrophilia and paedophilia as perversions, yet they are classic examples of sexual acts regarded as perversions. If one went further to say that statistically abnormal sexual practices had to be distinguished from normal ones not just by form (heterosexual sex) but also by the content involved (desire for children, corpses, pain, etc), this theory would still have loopholes. The preference for total darkness rather than dim light during sexual intercourse is statistically abnormal, yet one would hardly call that a perversion. In addition to that, should bestiality become a common practice, we would still call it a perversion. Defining sexual perversion mathematically also poses the problem of where morality fits into the picture. If sexual perversion were purely a mathematical concept, carrying no moral connotations, this would not account for our concept of sexual perversion as deserving disapproval or, at the very least, disgust.

The suffering philosopher makes a last attempt to analyse the concept of sexual perversion by latching onto our reactions to the practices viewed as sexual perversions. Common reactions are of horror and disgust, as to something not quite aesthetically pleasing. The picture of a man “knowing” a swan in the same way Adam “knew” Eve is not a pretty one. Yet, our views on what can be considered aesthetic vary significantly from person to person, as can be seen by Yeats’ almost erotic, violent, and yet certainly beautiful description of Zeus disguised as a swan holding Leda “upon his breast”: “How can those… fingers push the feathered glory from her loosening thighs? ” This picture does not make the reader cringe, unless it be in arousal. Ugliness alone cannot be used to define sexual perversion.

Having erased the unnatural, the statistically abnormal, the going against human flourishing, the immoral, and even the aesthetically displeasing as being the sole conditions for the definition of sexual perversion, it would appear to be the best course to discard the concept of sexual perversion altogether. Classifying sexual practices as pleasurable or unpleasurable, as good or bad, as moral or immoral is definitely easier and clearer than to classifying sexual practices as perverted or otherwise. However, like the grin of the Cheshire Cat, the concept of perversion cannot quite disappear from our minds, nor the words “sexual perversion” disappear from our vocabulary.

Why is this so? I believe that each of us, no matter how hard we try philosophically to be objective in this matter, view sex as being for a purpose more significant than the act itself. We treat our sexual organs with rather more respect or significance than we do the other parts of our body, covering them up with custom-made clothing, washing them more frequently and thoroughly than is perhaps needed. Our refusal to treat sex as a mere physical act channels into the oft-heard stories about prostitutes refusing to kiss their clients and porn stars confessing their regrets years later. Even though analysing the concept of sexual perversion has made nonsense of it, we still struggle to define acts we stubbornly perceive as sexually perverse.

All of us have expectations of sex we cannot get rid of. Our expectations cannot be explained away, they are always there. When the unexpected is thrown at us, our natural reaction would be to call it perverse. A rat trained to run in a particular maze keeps on running in that pattern and banging its head against walls when put in a different one. Like the rat, we seem to have an unexplainable instinct for running the old maze, identifying practices as sexual perversions, which instinct we cannot get rid of any more than the rat can learn a new route in a new maze. The existence of the word “perversion” is evidence enough of that. Like the grin of the Cheshire Cat, the concept of sexual perversion lingers on, even though the conditions for its existence have been methodically and logically removed. Blame it on the durned cat.